The RMSI 2012 fire services report: what India’s fire gap looked like, and what has changed since

In November 2012, a Noida-based consultancy called RMSI gave the Ministry of Home Affairs a 338-page report on the state of fire services in India. It is the most detailed official count we have found of what Indian fire brigades had, what they lacked and what it would cost to fix. Its figures turn up in parliamentary answers; the report behind them runs to 338 pages. This page goes through it: what it is, the standard it measured against, what it found, how the Home Ministry’s own later figures compare, and what the gaps mean for your family and your building. For the shorter version, see our note on the fire personnel shortfall.

What the RMSI report is

The full title is Fire Hazard and Risk Analysis in the Country for Revamping the Fire Services in the Country. The document we read is the “Final Report: National Report on Fire Hazard and Risk Analysis, Infrastructure and Institutional Assessment, and Key Recommendations”, dated November 2012. It was submitted to the Directorate General NDRF & Civil Defence (Fire), Ministry of Home Affairs, by RMSI of Sector 16, Noida. The Home Ministry told the Rajya Sabha on 26 June 2019 that its fire directorate engaged RMSI (which it calls Risk Management Solutions Inc.) in 2011, and it refers to the result as the “RMSI report 2012”. The study covered the whole country: 35 States and Union Territories, with a pilot in six of them (Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Delhi, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Puducherry) and the rest taken up in four later phases. RMSI’s team surveyed every fire station it could reach, using a headquarters form and a station form, and collected GPS locations. It then did four jobs. It ranked districts by fire hazard and risk using maps. It worked out where fire stations, vehicles, equipment and people were missing. It drew up a ten-year investment plan. And it built an open-source software tool, the Fire Decision Support System, to hold the data. Some limits are stated in the report itself. Forest-department fire services, private fire units, military cantonments and air bases, nuclear facilities, mines, ports, airports and refineries were left out. Census 2011 data were available only at district level. The fire load of individual industries was not measured. And uniform fire statistics for the past five years were not available across States.

A note on the Finance Commission link

It is often said that this study came out of the Thirteenth Finance Commission. We did not find that in the report. The text we read never mentions the Finance Commission, and it describes the study as planned by the Directorate of NDRF & Civil Defence (Fire Cell) after a national analysis by the Standing Fire Advisory Council. What is documented is separate: the Home Ministry told the Lok Sabha on 22 November 2016 that the Thirteenth Finance Commission had allocated ₹472 crore for fire services in seven States during 2010-15, and that ₹404.65 crore had been released. Both are documented; we cannot say they are connected.

The yardstick: SFAC norms

The Standing Fire Advisory Council (SFAC), which has representatives of every State, lays down norms for fire stations, equipment and manpower. For the first fire engine to reach a call, the norm is 3, 5 and 7 minutes in urban areas, depending on the risk category (A, B or C), and 20 minutes in rural areas. The same norms say one fire station for every 10 square km in urban areas and every 50 square km in rural areas. The Home Ministry has described these norms as advisory, and has called RMSI’s projected requirement “indicative in nature” (Lok Sabha reply, 22 November 2016). RMSI tested the two SFAC rules against each other by simulating fire-engine travel on the road network. It found they do not agree, because the area an engine can reach in five minutes depends on the roads. So it recommended response time as the main test: 5 to 7 minutes in urban areas and 20 minutes in rural areas. For vehicles it used the SFAC list with changes, for example one pumping unit for every 50,000 people up to 3 lakh. For personnel it used the Delhi Administrative Reforms Department norm for a double-shift roster, which it says is leaner than SFAC’s own.

What RMSI found, in numbers

RMSI counted 2,987 operational fire stations in its executive summary and 2,980 in its detailed tables (the report explains that seven Jammu and Kashmir stations moved next to other stations were counted once). We use 2,980, the table figure, below. Against the requirement it calculated, it found a gap in every category.

Category	Existing, Nov 2012	Additional need (RMSI)	Gap stated by RMSI
Fire stations	2,980	5,619 (1,347 urban, 4,272 rural)	65%
Fire-fighting and rescue vehicles	6,729	32,902	83%
Specialised equipment	not totalled in the summary	not totalled in the summary	about 94%
Fire personnel (double-shift basis)	51,163	5,59,681	92%

The existing-and-additional figures are in the report’s tables (Tables 42-2, 42-3, 42-5, 42-6, 42-17 to 42-20). Adding the existing count to the additional need gives a total requirement of 8,599 stations, 39,631 vehicles and 6,10,844 personnel. That addition is our arithmetic, but it reproduces RMSI’s own 65%, 83% and 92%, which is how we know we have read the tables correctly.

Fire stations: urban and rural

RMSI marked an ideal response area around each working station and then looked for towns and villages left outside. The stations that existed in 2012 were, on this map, ideally serving about 39.3 crore people, or 32.5% of the Census 2011 population of 121.0 crore (our arithmetic). To cover the rest it proposed 1,347 new urban stations, ideally serving about 15.3 crore people, and 4,272 new rural stations or posts, ideally serving about 65.7 crore people. Rural posts were to be placed at larger villages of 5,000 to 10,000 people or at major road junctions. Put simply, there was about one fire station for every 4.06 lakh people in 2012 (2,980 stations, Census 2011 population; our arithmetic).

Vehicles, equipment and people

For vehicles, the report counted 6,729 in 2012 and a gap of 32,902: 9,337 at existing stations, 4,275 more for the new urban stations (the difference between its Tables 42-4 and 42-5; our arithmetic) and 19,290 for rural stations. For personnel it counted 51,163 against a gap of 5,59,681: 2,19,477 at existing stations, 76,685 for new urban stations (again our subtraction) and 2,63,519 for rural ones. The specialised equipment gap, such as hydraulic rescue tools, breathing apparatus sets and thermal imaging cameras, was put at about 94%. Training was a gap of its own. Over ten years, RMSI estimated that 4,40,546 people would need basic fireman training and 2,51,913 refresher training, with 71,323 leading-fireman courses, 36,145 specialised courses, 52,161 junior-officer courses and 3,397 divisional-officer courses, if all the posts were filled.

What else RMSI wrote

Beyond the counts, the report made 22 recommendations. A few stand out for ordinary readers. It asked for a Fire Prevention and Fire Safety Act in every State and Union Territory, with the National Building Code strictly followed in high-rise buildings, schools, cinema halls and hospitals. It asked for dedicated fire prevention wings and a fire education van in each district, saying such a wing might prevent a repeat of the AMRI hospital fire in Kolkata. It asked that fire engines not be used to clean drains or supply water, because a small fire could grow while the engine is away. It asked for quick-response vehicles and motorcycles with water-mist sets in congested lanes, and for roads to be widened and decongested so that engines can reach the scene. It also recommended that municipal fire services be brought under State fire services, since no single municipality can handle serious fires alone. RMSI also noted that ambulances attached to fire stations usually had no paramedic and little life-support equipment, and that many municipal services could not enforce fire safety rules for want of clear directions from the authorities that control them.

Cost: what RMSI said it would take

RMSI estimated a ten-year investment of about ₹3,82,112 crore, including inflation, to fill every gap. Of this, about ₹2,79,125 crore is staff salary, which recurs each year. The rest is buildings (about ₹48,243 crore), vehicles and equipment (about ₹17,958 crore) and running costs. The report suggested a fire tax of 1% of property tax, a fire cess on safety inspections, paid training for private staff and plan-scrutiny fees as ways to raise money. These are 2012 estimates and should not be read as today’s cost.

State by state

The table gives RMSI’s station figures for each State and Union Territory (Table 42-2, November 2012) and, in the last column, the number of stations the Home Ministry reported for 31 December 2018. The last column comes from a different document and must not be read as RMSI’s figure. Maharashtra had the most to add on RMSI’s count: 917 stations on top of its 157. Rajasthan needed 748 more, Bihar 548 and Uttar Pradesh 469. Delhi needed 55 more.

State / UT	Operational, Nov 2012	New urban	New rural	RMSI total	Share still to add	Reported, 31 Dec 2018
Andaman & Nicobar Islands	20	0	6	26	23%	24
Andhra Pradesh *	251	130	228	609	59%	346
Arunachal Pradesh	13	1	30	44	70%	19
Assam	110	25	67	202	46%	124
Bihar	102	82	466	650	84%	107
Chandigarh	7	4	0	11	36%	7
Chhattisgarh	33	14	103	150	78%	33
Dadra and Nagar Haveli	1	1	4	6	83%	1
Daman and Diu	3	3	0	6	50%	3
Delhi	53	46	9	108	51%	53
Goa	15	4	9	28	46%	15
Gujarat	183	47	164	394	54%	183
Haryana	82	34	80	196	58%	82
Himachal Pradesh	25	11	83	119	79%	25
Jammu and Kashmir	156	27	94	277	44%	175
Jharkhand	31	12	137	180	83%	33
Karnataka	182	63	132	377	52%	195
Kerala	100	57	71	228	56%	100
Lakshadweep	4	0	5	9	56%	4
Madhya Pradesh	292	58	163	513	43%	292
Maharashtra	157	251	666	1074	85%	157
Manipur	16	11	26	53	70%	16
Meghalaya	32	2	15	49	35%	36
Mizoram	12	8	31	51	76%	12
Nagaland	9	10	29	48	81%	13
Odisha	180	25	126	331	46%	340
Puducherry	13	4	0	17	24%	13
Punjab	48	34	93	175	73%	48
Rajasthan	126	107	641	874	86%	126
Sikkim	9	1	15	25	64%	10
Tamil Nadu	303	46	102	451	33%	315
Tripura	35	3	15	53	34%	40
Uttar Pradesh	237	117	352	706	66%	253
Uttarakhand	33	33	58	124	73%	35
West Bengal	107	76	252	435	75%	142
India	2,980	1,347	4,272	8,599	65%	3,377

* Andhra Pradesh in RMSI’s table includes the area that is now Telangana. The 2018 column adds Andhra Pradesh (251) and Telangana (95) for that reason. RMSI’s Jammu and Kashmir figure counts 156 operational stations against 163 in State records.

A figure that is often mixed up

You may have seen “97.54% deficiency in fire stations, 80.04% in vehicles and 96.28% in personnel”. These numbers appear in the first pages of the RMSI report, but RMSI does not claim them. It quotes them as the result of “a recent analysis” by the Standing Fire Advisory Council, citing the NDMA guideline of 2012 and an SFAC paper of 2011. RMSI’s own findings are the lower percentages above: 65% for stations, 83% for vehicles and 92% for personnel. The two sets measure different things and should not be placed in one sentence as if they were the same finding.

Why the gaps exist

The report’s first answer is structural. Fire service sits in the Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution as a municipal function, and it is run by the State or Union Territory and by urban local bodies. RMSI notes that in Maharashtra, Haryana, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh (except Indore) and Punjab it was then under municipal corporations, and under the Home Department in the rest. The Centre advises and supports, but the Home Ministry told the Lok Sabha in November 2016 that providing adequate fire stations is the primary responsibility of the municipal bodies and State governments. The second answer is history. RMSI says fire services grew “on an ad-hoc basis”, with no scientific study of risk, and that a lack of planning knowledge, institutions and funds were the main hurdles. Our own reading of the numbers adds a third point: the largest absolute gaps in 2012 were in big, populous States with many villages (Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh), where a rural post is needed every few kilometres. A fire service built only around towns would not reach them.

What has changed since 2012

The Thirteenth Finance Commission, 2010-15

The Home Ministry listed the Finance Commission’s fire grants in its Lok Sabha reply of 22 November 2016. They went to seven States only. The amounts are in rupees crore.

State	Allocation, 2010-15	Released by 2014-15
Andhra Pradesh (including Telangana)	17.00	16.15
Haryana	100.00	100.00
Mizoram	20.00	16.00
Odisha	150.00	135.00
Tripura	15.00	15.00
Uttar Pradesh	20.00	10.00
West Bengal	150.00	112.50
Total	472.00	404.65

What the Home Ministry reported for 31 December 2018

On 26 June 2019 the Home Ministry gave the Rajya Sabha State-wise figures, collected from the States in 2018, under the heading “requirement as per RMSI report 2012”. For India as a whole it showed 3,377 fire stations against a requirement of 8,559; 54,239 personnel against a column headed requirement of 5,57,123; and 7,306 vehicles against 32,710. The last two requirement figures are not totals, as the third caution below explains. The station figures are the ones behind our report on how many fire stations India needs.

Set against RMSI’s 2012 counts, both official, the picture is of slow growth: stations up by 397 (13.3%), personnel up by 3,076 (6.0%) and vehicles up by 577 (8.6%) in about six years (our arithmetic). Three cautions apply before anyone writes “the gap has narrowed”.

• Counts that did not move. In 18 of 35 State and Union Territory rows the 2018 station count is exactly the 2012 count, including Maharashtra (157), Delhi (53), Gujarat (183), Madhya Pradesh (292) and Rajasthan (126). Either no station was added or the figure was not refreshed; the documents do not say. Three rows account for 290 of the 397 net new stations: Odisha (180 to 340), Andhra Pradesh with Telangana (251 to 346) and West Bengal (107 to 142).
• The requirement figures differ. The 2019 reply adds up to 8,559 stations required. RMSI’s own Table 42-2 adds up to 8,599 (2,980 existing, 1,347 urban, 4,272 rural). The reply prints a national gap of 5,191, but 8,559 minus 3,377 is 5,182; the difference is Odisha, which reported 340 stations against a requirement of 331 and is shown with a gap of zero.
• Personnel and vehicles are not totals. For stations the reply’s “requirement” is a total: Maharashtra’s 1,074 is its 157 existing stations plus 917 more. For personnel and vehicles the same column matches the RMSI report’s additional need, not its total. Rajasthan’s personnel requirement in the reply is 29,937, against 29,936 additional personnel in RMSI’s own State table (6,367 + 4,720 + 18,849), and Delhi and Maharashtra also agree to within one post. For India the reply shows 5,57,123 personnel and 32,710 vehicles; RMSI’s additional need is 5,59,681 and 32,902, and its totals are 6,10,844 and 39,631 (our arithmetic). The reply’s printed gaps of 5,03,365 personnel and 25,460 vehicles then take the 2018 count off a second time, so we do not use them. On RMSI’s basis, the 54,239 personnel reported for 2018 are less than one-tenth of the roughly 6.1 lakh the study implies (our arithmetic).

We have not found any later national count of stations, personnel or vehicles from the Home Ministry. For that reason this page does not claim a current gap.

The Fifteenth Finance Commission and the 2023 scheme

The Fifteenth Finance Commission earmarked ₹5,000 crore from the Preparedness and Capacity Building window of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) for strengthening State fire services over 2021-22 to 2025-26. The Home Ministry framed a Scheme for Expansion and Modernization of Fire Services in the States and sent it to the States in July 2023. Its terms, from the scheme document:

• Up to ₹4,500 crore goes to the States, in shares fixed by population (50%), area (25%) and urbanisation (25%). The other ₹500 crore is kept to reward States for legal and infrastructure reforms.
• States pay 25% of project cost; the North-Eastern and Himalayan States pay 10%. The States’ combined share works out to ₹1,387.99 crore against the Centre’s ₹4,499.84 crore.
• About 30% is for new fire stations (the document says roughly ₹6 crore for a two-bay station with a mini water tender and a water tender with rescue equipment), 5% for State training centres, 50% for modern vehicles, equipment and upgraded control rooms, and 15% for State-specific needs.
• No money may go to staff quarters, and salaries stay with the States. Funds are released in instalments against utilisation certificates.

The Tribune reported on 29 March 2025 that a high-level committee had approved ₹1,604.39 crore for five more States (Bihar ₹340.90 crore, Gujarat ₹339.18 crore, Jharkhand ₹147.97 crore, Kerala ₹162.25 crore and Maharashtra ₹614.09 crore), after earlier approving proposals from 20 States worth ₹3,373.12 crore. We have not seen a count of stations actually built or an up-to-date release figure, so we make no claim about how many new stations the scheme has produced. For scale, ₹5,000 crore is about 1.3% of RMSI’s ₹3.8 lakh crore ten-year estimate. The comparison is rough, because RMSI’s figure includes salaries and 2012 price assumptions with inflation, and the scheme does not pay salaries. It does show that the scheme covers a fraction of a fully funded plan.

Is there a national fire law?

Not that we could find. The Directorate General’s website carries a Model Bill to Provide for the Maintenance of a Fire and Emergency Service for the State, revised in 2019, and an older Model Fire Force Bill of 1958. These are templates for State legislatures, not central laws. The 2019 model provides for one fire service for the whole State, fire safety certificates, fire safety officers, a fire tax and a Fire Prevention and Life Safety Fund, several of which echo RMSI’s recommendations. We did not find a central fire safety bill before Parliament, and we cannot say how many States have adopted the model. We also did not look into whether the National Disaster Mitigation Fund pays for fire services; the 2023 scheme document names the NDRF window, not that fund.

What the gaps mean for you

Everything above is the report and the official figures. What follows is our own practical advice, drawn from our other guides, and not a finding of the report. The report did not measure how long an engine takes to reach any particular street, and no national average is available. What it does show is that, on RMSI’s map, the stations then working could reach only about 32% of the population within the 5 to 7 minutes (cities) or 20 minutes (countryside) norm, and that is before asking whether each station had enough crew and engines. A gap this size means you should not plan on the fire brigade arriving before a small fire becomes a large one. The first few minutes belong to the people in the building.

• Call early. Dial 101 for fire, 112 for any emergency and 108 for an ambulance. Say the building name, landmark and the nearest main road, and send someone to the gate to guide the engine in.
• Keep the way in clear. RMSI itself asked for roads to be widened and decongested so that engines can reach the scene faster. Keep your society gate, lane and driveway clear, and do not park across a fire lane.
• Look for the fire safety certificate, not just the fire station. RMSI says built-in fire safety arrangements and escape facilities are much more important than a fire service alone. Ask whether your building, school, hospital or shop has a valid Fire NOC and working alarms and exits, and read our guide to the Fire NOC in India for what to check.
• Do not rely on the ladder. In the Takshashila Arcade fire in Surat in 2019, the only staircase filled with fire and smoke within minutes and the students on the top floor were trapped. A second exit and a short, practised drill matter more than the speed of the fire engine.
• Be ready for the first five minutes. Have a serviced extinguisher or a fire blanket for kitchens, a working smoke alarm, and a family plan for getting out.
• Ask your local representative. Which fire station is closest to your ward, and has it got a working engine and a full crew? RMSI’s report and the Home Ministry’s replies are public, and State figures are in the table above.

How we checked the figures

We read the RMSI National Report in full on 19 October 2026 from the Directorate General’s website, and read the Home Ministry’s Lok Sabha reply of 22 November 2016 and Rajya Sabha reply of 26 June 2019 through the Internet Archive’s saved copies, because the ministry’s site did not open for us. We read the 2023 scheme document, the Directorate General’s Model Bill of 2019 and the Tribune report of 29 March 2025. Where a total is ours rather than the report’s, the text says so. The report carries a “Confidential” footer on every page, although it is posted on the Directorate General’s public site.